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Since the Pearce Committee suggested in 1987 that all law schools should examine "the 
adequacy of their attention to theoretical and critical perspectives, including the study of law in 
operation and the study of the relations between law and other social forces,"1 many, if not most, 
Australian law schools have done something along those lines.  However, these responses have 
not been without their problems.  Students enter Law Schools with a wide range of backgrounds; 
some have just left high school - and many of those have studied mathematics and the physical 
sciences in order to get a high HSC aggregate, OP rating, or the equivalent in the various States - 
while others may have a postgraduate degree in politics or sociology, or several years' work 
experience in a legal or related field.  It is hard to know what level a context or theory course 
should be pitched at, and what it should include. 
 
I suggest that we should compare our approach with that of other Faculties that teach 
"professional" degrees.  Medical students need to know a good deal of chemistry and 
biochemistry and some physics.  Engineering students need a grounding in mathematics and 
physics, and, for some branches of engineering, chemistry.  So in nearly all Universities the 
course requirements for those degrees include several subjects/units in the science subjects - 
taught in the Science Faculties (and the medical schools at two Universities have just followed 
the practice of American Law Schools by requiring that their students have completed a degree 
in another faculty).  In contrast, we take the whole load upon ourselves. 
 
Of course, some Law Schools in Australia require students to complete a pre-law year in the 
Faculty of Arts, and these days a greater proportion of law students are studying combined 
degrees.  But these don't necessarily equip the students for an informed critique of law, or for 
Pearce's suggested focus on "the study of law in operation and the study of the relations between 
law and other social forces".  Accountancy or Chemistry are not much use for that - nor, for that 
matter, is English Literature , and though general History may provide some background to a 
critique of law it hardly provides the tools for the critique.  What we need to do is work out what 
disciplines students ought to be introduced to, in order to learn the knowledge, theories and 
insights that will help them better understand and criticise law and the way it affects society - and 
then set them for study in a prescriptive pre-law year.   
 
So, what should such a pre-law year include?  I can come up with a list of eight units which 
should be prescribed - which, coincidentally enough, is the number of one-semester units that 
makes a full-time first-year load in many Arts Faculties:  
 
* Two units covering different aspects of politics: 
 
- A descriptive unit in Government or Politics, covering the institutions of government, the 
federal system and the law-making process.  To begin the study of law with almost no 
knowledge of the political system, as many students do, is just ridiculous. 
 
-  A unit on political philosophy, that is, normative theories of politics.  Since all law is politics, 
students should learn to recognise which political values are embedded in the law, and the basis 
of argument for alternative legal outcomes.  
 




Committee2 - but the history of law does not have to be taught in the spirit of "Gee whiz, weren't 
the old forms of action and fictions fun!"  It can be taught with an emphasis on the way in which 
the overall spirit of the law has changed from century to century, using as a framework a 
categorisation such as Dicey's Old Toryism → individualism → collectivism,3 or any of the 
several similar ones.  This could readily cross-refer to a unit in political ideologies, or indeed the 
two topics could be merged into a year-long unit, something like Macquarie's History and 
Philosophy of Law.  
 
*  Reasoning - by which I mean a unit including both formal logic and the study of informal 
reasoning - these things are taught in schools of Philosophy, and sometimes in schools of 
Communications.  I remember a student who complained to me one day that he could not 
understand a particular High Court case, even after very careful reading.  I asked "Could the 
problem be, not that you can't understand the reasoning, but that you think it's wrong?"  His face 
lit up; he realised that he did indeed think it was wrong (so did I, obviously), but he had been 
trying to `understand' it on the implicit assumption that it must be well-reasoned.  With the right 
kind of training in reasoning, students might develop sufficient confidence in their reasoning 
skills so that they ask that sort of question themselves. 
 
*  Ethics and ethical reasoning.  I suggest this, not only to prepare students for a later specialised 
unit on professional ethics, but also so that they can appreciate the extent to which ethical rules 
are, and are not, incorporated into the rules and principles of law. 
 
*  Sociology for Lawyers.  Here I think I am suggesting a unit somewhat different from any 
existing "Sociology 101".  What I suggest law students particularly need is a unit on social order 
and the resolution of disputes.  It could start with a conspectus of the  sociological theories on 
what maintains order in society (consensus, interactions, legitimate authority or 
dominance/hegemony), move on to a comparative study of different ways of resolving disputes 
and the variety of ways we do it in our system, leading to studies of the effect of law on people's 
behaviour and the effect of lawyers on the workings of the law. 
 
*  Economics.  Similarly, what I think the beginner-lawyer needs falls in between the usual 
introductory units in macro- and micro-economics.  A law student should know enough about 
competition theory to understand restrictive practices law, and to be able to understand the 
theory's appeal to political/legal theorists of the Right; enough about transaction costs to 
understand and criticise economic theories of law; enough about basic concepts of income and 
capital appreciation to understand income tax cases; and enough about government finance to 
understand arguments about the fiscal powers in the Commonwealth Constitution.  As with 
politics, ethics and sociology, I suggest that it would be better if law students had learned this 
first from economists before we try to get the ideas across in ten minutes in a law class. 
 
*  Communication (oral and written).  The standards of oral and written communication of 
entrants to Law Schools vary from the fluent to the barely-coherent.  Perhaps entrants could be 
tested and this could be compulsory only for those who need it?  Some certainly need intensive 
tuition - and there are people in other Faculties who specialise in providing it. 
 
Comments and possible criticisms 
 
Only a token? It might be said that a semester of each of the prerequisite disciplines would not be 
enough to give students more than a superficial introduction to them.  However, it would at least 
give students broader knowledge than the little we expect them to pick up by "osmosis" as they 




discover an interest in one or other of the subjects of study, and perhaps take time off from the 
law degree to major in the discipline of interest.  If they came back to law, well and good; if they 
did not, well - at least they'd be studying something that really interested them. 
 
Place in the degree structure:  I am not suggesting that these units should be a formal part of the 
LLB degree; we would simply specify, as some Law Schools do already, that those who intend 
to study law should have first done one year of a BA.  This would have the benefit that students 
would qualify for entry to a law degree on the basis of their performance in studies which are 
something like law studies; not surprisingly, performance in tertiary studies is a better predictor 
of law school performance than secondary school results.4  Perhaps, like the Schools that already 
require a year in Arts, we could award a "B Juris" as well, but I would suggest not.  Law 
graduates would have passing grades for eight BA or BBus/BEc/BCom subjects on their record.  
It would be up to them whether they decided to build that into another degree. 
 
Too long at Uni?  The obvious drawback to this proposal is that it seems that students would 
have an extra year added to their studies, and still come out with only one degree.  However, it 
might be possible to reduce the time spent on the LLB itself by a year.  Our Law School and 
others already have an accelerated program for graduates, and the Pearce Committee floated the 
idea of a three-year Law degree in a preliminary issues paper, though it did not follow up on that 
suggestion.  (We should be able to give credit with some flexibility for graduate entrants, but, 
bearing in mind that a graduate may know a lot about some specialised field and nothing about 
politics, ethics, sociology - or, indeed, the world - we would really want them to be able to show 
some knowledge of each of the relevant areas of study if they were not to be made to study it 
formally.  Perhaps it could be assessed for credit purposes in a less formal way than it would be 
in a formal course of study.) 
 
Consequences for the rest of the syllabus 
 
Having insisted that students come into our faculties with all this prerequisite knowledge, we 
would then have to ensure that we made constructive use of it.  Neil Gold has commented that 
where study in the liberal arts and social sciences has been required of law students it has largely 
failed  "either because legal education has not sought to link this learning with law and to 
develop further the relationship between law and other learnings, or because once in practice 
both professional mores and continuing education rarely underscore their importance."5   
 
One conclusion from this might be that we may as well give up on the attempt to emphasise 
critical and contextual perspectives, and go back to a "trade school" or "primary school" 
approach.  But if we are to make a serious attempt to include some critique among the teaching 
of the existing rules, I doubt that it can be done simply by adding a few units such as "Law and 
Society" or "Law in Context" to the law degree.  We need first to insist that students have first 
learnt something of the disciplines which provide the ideas and the language for critique, and 
then to remember in our later-year subjects that it is possible to teach and learn the existing rules 
and principles, and ask "Why?" and "Who does this benefit?" and "What different approaches 
would be possible?" at the same time.  It would be very much up to those designing and 
delivering the subjects with predominantly "black-letter" content to make sure that there was 
sufficient opportunity for critique in their units.  They may even find, once all students have had 
their minds opened to the disciplines which provide the source of critique of law, that many of 
them demand such opportunities. 
 
Notes 




2. Op cit, p 108. 
3. Law and Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed, Macmillan, 1940 
4. See J Bradsen and J Farrington, "Student Selection and Performance in the Faculty of Law" 
(1986) 1 Aust U Rev 25. 
5. "The Role of the University Law Schools in Professional Formation in Law" (1987) 4 J Prof 
Leg Ed 15, 19 
 
John Pyke is at the QUT Law School  (j.pyke@qut.edu.au) 
